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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
JOYCE M. DESPAIN,

)
)

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

ROBERT V. DESPAIN,

No. 17034

)
)

Defendant and
Appellant.

)

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's
motion for termination of child support payments under a
decree of divorce.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a motion to modify the provisions of
the divorce decree which required him to pay child support
to his two children while they were full-time students and
residing with respondent.

Specifically, appellant's motion
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was that the decree be modified to terminate appellant's
responsibility to make payments after his children reached
age 21.

The district judge denied appellant's motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the district judge's
ruling denying appellant's motion for modification of the
divorce decree.
However, if the court grants the modification of the
decree the appellant seeks, respondent requests the court
to remand for a full review of the entire divorce decree.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set
forth in appellant's brief except she does not agree with
appellant's characterization of the judicial decisions
appellant refers to.

Those decisions, discussed below in

ARGUMENT, POINTS I and II, do not apply to a divorce decree
based on a property settlement agreement.

Furthermore,

those decisions did not establish a new principle of law.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALTHOUGH A COURT MAY NOT ORDER
CHILD SUPPORT BEYOND THE CHILD'S
AGE OF MAJORITY, A COURT MAY
ENFORCE A VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT
FOR SUCH SUPPORT.
Appellant correctly states that absent special circumstances a parent "has no duty to support his children beyond
the age of 18."

Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 6.

Appellant

argues that this rule requires that the decree in this case be
modified.

In making this argument appellant overlooks the

importance of the distinction between an order of the court made
after trial and a voluntary agreement of the parties which is
accepted by the court and incorporated into the decree.

Although

the law does not impose a child support duty beyond the child's
age of majority absent unusual circumstances, Carlson v. Carlson
584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978), a parent is free to voluntarily undertake this responsibility by agreement.
In spite of the general rule that a divorce court cannot
order the support of an adult child,
the parents may agree that the father shall
support a child after majority, as where the
father is to support a child until he or she
graduates from college, or until the child
becomes self-supporting, and the court may
adopt such an agreement and require the father
to comply with the decree.
24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation §832 (1966)
added)

(emphasis

(footnote omitted).

In the case of Robrock v. Robrock, 150 N.E.2d 421
(Ohio 1958), the court held:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Where, as part of a valid agreement,
a husband agrees to provide a college education for his children and further agrees to
keep in effect insurance policies on his life
in which such children are beneficiaries, and
where such agreement is incorporated in a
decree divorcing the husband from his wife, such
decree becomes binding upon the husband even
though the performance required by the decree may
extend beyond the minority of the children.
Id. at 422-23.

"We are of the.opinion," the court stated,

"that such agreements should not be impaired for the reason
that the court, if acting without such agreement, would not
have the authority to impose such an obligation."

Id. at 428.

The validity of the holding of Robrock was recently reaffirmed
and relied on in Grant v. Grant, 396 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio Ct. App.
1977) ..
In White v. White, 223 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1976), it was held
that "a court may enforce by contempt proceedings its order,
entered by consent, that child support payments be made beyond
the time for which there is a duty to provide support."
379.

Id. at

In the recent Colorado case of Haynes v. Haynes, 586 P.2d

1010 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978), the court upheld a decree adopting
a property settlement agreement requiring support for post-high
school education.

In the Kansas case of Clark v. Chipman, 510

P.2d 1257 (Kan. 1973), the court sanctioned the validity of a
divorce decree which incorporated a property settlement requiring
the husband to pay for the college education of his children
"'regardless of their age.'"

Id. at 1261.
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Appellant argues that upholding the parties agreement in
this case would discourage future property settlements.
Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9.

On the contrary, such a

holding would actually encourage property settlements.

This

was recognized by the court in Robrock when it explained why
divorce decrees adopting agreements such as this should be
enforced:
It is entirely possible, perhaps probable,
that a wife may be willing to give up, by way
of agreement with her husband, much to which
she would be entitled in consideration of the
husband doing more than he might be required
to do for their children. To disregard such
agreements when incorporated in a divorce
decree, at least so far as the power of the
court to enforce them is concerned, would discourage the settlement of differences between
husband and wife or reduce such agreements,
when made, to cloaks to be put on or shed at
will.
Robrock v. Robrock, 150 N.E.2d 421, 427 (Ohio 1958).
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly

recogniz~d

that

decrees based on property settlement agreements must be given
special treatment.

In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980),

the court noted that although a decree based on an agreement is
modifiable,
when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreement, forged by the parties
and sanctioned by the court, equity must
take such agreement into consideration.
Equity is not available to reinstate rights
and privileges voluntarily contracted away
simply because one has come to regret the
bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

the continuing jurisdiction of the court
where a property settlement .agreement has
been incorporated into the decree, and the
outright abrogation of the provisions of such
an agreement is only to be resorted to with
great reluctance and for compelling reasons.
Id. at 1250-51 (footnotes omitted).

In the present case, the

district judge acted properly by giving deference to the agreement freely entered into by the parties.

Although the district

judge had discretion to modify the parties' agreement in this
case, he did not abuse his discretion by refusing to do so.
In the relief appellant seeks he implicitly recognizes that
a court can enforce an agreement to provide support where a duty
could not otherwise be imposed.

Appellant has requested modifi-

cation of the decree but "has accepted that pursuant to his
agreement, support should continue to
Brief on Appeal at 9 (emphasis added).

~ge

21."

Appellant's

Since, in the absence of

special circumstances, a court cannot order support peyond age 18,
appellant has taken an inconsistent position in making this
request.

By so doing, appellant has clearly recognized that the

rule which prevents a court from ordering child support beyond
the child's age of majority does not destroy the right of a
father to voluntarily agree to provide such support.
Appellant cites three cases in support of the principle
that absent special or unusual circumstances a parent has no
duty to support his children beyond the age of 18:
English, 565 P.2d 409

English v.

(Utah 1977); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d

864 (Utah 1978); and Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah 1978).
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While these cases do support that principle, they go no furth~r.
In none of these cases did the court face a situation where the
order in question was based upon an agreement between the parties.
Appellant then cites Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980)
in further support of this principle.

However, as in the other

cases cited by appellant, in Kerr there was no agreement between
the parties.
Appellant cites Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978),
for the proposition that a court has no power, absent compelling
special circumstances, to order a parent to pay for his child's
college education.

The Ferguson case is likewise not on point.

In Ferguson the child's mother was seeking a modification of a
divorce decree to require her former husband to continue to make
support payments to her daughter beyond age 18, apparently to
finance her college education.

Unlike the present case, the

parties had made no agreement that such support would be provided.
An important distinction between a decree of the court

which is based on an agreement of the parties and one that is
not was recognized in Ferguson.

In affirming the trial court's

refusal to order child support beyond the age of 18, the court
explained,
Ordinarily a parent will be more than
willing to aid and assist an adult child in
securing a college education; however, one
should not be compelled to do so by court
order, except perhaps in some unusual circumstance, not present here.
If he does not
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have the interests of his children at heart,
that is and should be a matter of his own
conscience and not of the court's.
Id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
In the present case, appellant was not compelled by the
court to accept the obligation of supporting his two children
during their college education.

This was a responsibility he

freely and voluntarily entered into as part of the 1976 property
settlement agreement.

The rule that a court cannot order child

support beyond the age of 18 absent special circumstances is not
applicable.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO RELEVANT, SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN THE LAW BETWEEN THE ENTRY
OF THE DIVORCE DECREE AND APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO MODIFY THE DECREE. DURING
THAT PERIOD THE SUPREME COURT MERELY
ARTICULATED MORE CLEARLY A WELLESTABLI SHED RULE.
Appellant characterizes the cases of English v. English,
..

565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah
1978); and Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2q 435 (Utah 1978) as establishing "a substantial change in the law which require[s] a reexamination of the Decree."

Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 5.

It is true that these cases did clearly articulate the principle
that a parent, absent special circumstances, has no duty to
support his children beyond the age of their majority.

However,

this principle was not a new one.
In Carlson, the court described it as a "time-honored
and universally recognized rule that when a child reaches the
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age of majority, the child becomes emancipated and the legal
obligation of the parents to support the child and the reciprocal legal obligation of the child to the family, terminate."
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah 1978)

(footnote

omitted).
In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) the court held
that a court may extend the child support obligation beyond the
age of majority upon a showing of special circumstances.

The

clear implication of Dehm, decided and published ten months
before the entry of the divorce decree in the present case, was
that absent such special circumstances the court could not
impose such a duty.
Thus, since there was no relevant change of law, uhe cited
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court created no relevant change
of circumstances requiring a modification of the decree.
POINT III
EVEN IF THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE
LAW, THE PARTICULAR CHANGE ASSERTED
BY APPELLANT IS NOT A MATERIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD
REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE.
Child support provisions of divorce decrees are modifiable
under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1)

(Supp. 1979).

Appellant cites

no authority to support his assertion that a change of law can
constitute a change of circumstances requiring such modification.
Nor does appellant show how the supposed change of law in this
case would be material to the divorce decree involved here.
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"In order that a change of circumstances may be deemed
sufficient to overcome the principle of res judicata it must be
substantial and material."
Separation §847 (1966)

24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and

(footnotes omitted).

Even if the

decisions cited by appellant are considered to represent a
change in the law, the only changed circumstance would be
that whereas before these decisions appellant might have believed
a court might order child support beyond the age of 18 absent
special circumstances, after these decisions appellant would
know that a court could not.

This kind of changed circumstance

would not be material to the modification of the divorce decree.
First, it would not be material because, as discussed
above, the principle enunciated in the cited decisions does not
apply to an agreed-upon property· settlement.
Second, the change would not be material because the
ultimate tests a court must apply in considering a motion to
modify a child support decree are "the needs of the child and
the ability of the father to pay."

Id.

(footnote omitted).

See generally Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978)
(considering "the needs of the children and the ability of the
father and mother to provide for them"}.
change, the decree is modifiable.
no such circumstances have changed.

When these circumstances

In the present case, however,
The asserted change in the

law has nothing to do with the children's needs or the parents'
ability to pay.
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POINT IV
IF AN ESSENTIAL TERM OF THE
DIVORCE DECREE IS MODIFIED,
THE ENTIRE DECREE SHOULD BE
REVIEWED AND REVISED.
The complaint in this case was filed on November 15, 1973.
It was not until three years later, on November 24, 1976, after
a lengthy period of detailed bargaining, that the terms of the
property settlement were finally agreed upon.

In addition to

providing for child support, the agreement specifically provided
for the disposition of motor vehicles, the home, securities,
rights in a limited partnership, certain liqueur glasses, and
a particular painting.

It specifically provided for life insurance,

medical insurance, and dental expenses.

Eacb element.of the agree-

ment was carefully considered and negotiated, and each element was
an important part of the consideration for the entire agreement.
The modification of child support and property distribution
provisions of a divorce decree must be reasonable.
Ann. §30-3-5(1)

(Supp. 1979).

Utah Code

In this case it would not be

reasonable to abrogate that portion of the agreement which
provides that the appellant shall assist with his children's
college education without reviewing the effect of this change on
the other terms of the agreement.

As in Robrock, it is possible

that the respondent in this case gave up "much to which she would
be entitled in consideration of the husband doing more than he
might be required to do for the children."
150 N.E.2d 421, 427 (Ohio 1958).

Robrock v. Robrock,

Since this provision for
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continued child support was a bargained-for term which became an
essential and material part of the divorce settlement, if it is
to be changed there should be a full review of the entire
divorce settlement and not merely one aspect of it.
Although a contractual arrangement can be modified, "the
law does not countenance a change in the contractual status
which would result in unfair advantage to one or impose an undue
burden on the other .

"

17A C.J.S. Contracts §373 (1963).

To allow the modification appellant seeks without reviewing its
effects on the entire property settlement would give appellant
an unfair advantage and unfairly burden respondent with a financial
responsibility which was not originally intended to be hers
under the terms of the agreement.
The law concerning the partial termination and partial
rescission of contracts is analogous to the situation presented
here.

"Usually a partial termination of a contract is not

favored by the courts unless the parties have expressly agreed
thereto."

17A C.J.S. Contracts §403 (1963)

(footnote omitted).

Similarly, "[a] rescission of a contract generally must be in
toto.

A party cannot affirm it in part and repudiate it in

part.

He cannot accept the benefits on the one hand while he

shirks its disadvantages on the other."
omitted).
1974).

Id. §416 (footnote

See Pickinpaugh v. Morton, 519 P.2d 91, 95 (Ore.

A partial rescission is generally only possible "where

the parts of a contract are so severable from each other as to
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form independent contracts."
(footnote omitted).

17A C.J.S. Contracts §416 (1963)

The child support provisions of the

property settlement agreement in this case do not form a
separate contract.
agreement.

They are an integral part of the entire

The abrogation of a portion of the agreement without

a re-examination of the entire agreement would unfairly benefit
appellant and deprive respondent of her bargained-for
consideration.

CONCLUSION

The order of the district judge in favor of respondent
should be affirmed.

The rule that a court may not order child

support beyond the child's age of majority does not prevent a
court from enforcing a voluntary agreement to provide such
support.

The cases which articulate this rule did not change

the law, but even if they did, such a change would not be
the kind of changed circumstance which would require the
modification of the parties' property settlement agreement.
If the order of the district judge is not affirmed and
the child support provisions of the property settlement

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

agreement are modified, the court should order a full review of
the entire property settlement agreement to prevent an unjust
result.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of August, 1980.
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